1. Workforce mobility dimensions

Historically ATCO mobility between states has not been used too often. The reasons are far from simply the geographically specific training or lack of technology. On the one hand the availability of technology does not automatically mean that an ATCO, a doctor, a pharmacist or a lawyer can work in another EU Member State without fulfilling the specific requirements of that state. On the other hand, as stated by CANSO, ATCEUC and ETF, mobility should continue to be on a voluntary basis to avoid the introduction of social dumping and assist in the prevention of social tensions.

2. How to respond to Airspace Architecture Study

In the Airspace Architecture Study, the geographical constraints on air traffic services provision are identified as limiting factors for capacity. In the new target architecture, the term “ATCO mobility” should be replaced by “Geographically decoupled ATS” which gives the notion of ATS provider decoupled from its geographical location.

The use of technology and automation always imposes many safety and capacity related uncertainties and risks that can be managed only at the level of an ATS provider.

3. Safety in ATM is managed by an organisation

There is a drive to make the ATCO profession more commercial off-the-shelf, less specific, easily achievable and interchangeable. However due to specifics, the ATCO profession is far from being a set of trivial competencies (“turn left”, “turn right”). Those specifics stem from the ultimate role of ATM to ensure the safety of air traffic. This must be acknowledged, and rigorously managed because incidents in aviation have unacceptably heavy consequences. This is well documented by ICAO and commonly known as Safety Management System (SMS). The management of safety is a pivotal obligation in Regulation 2017/373 as well.
The ability for an ATCO to manage, within certain defined parameters, any airspace independently from its geographical location could make sense only in the context of an ATS provider. Although ratings of the ATCO licenses are recognized in all EU Member States, the endorsement for a particular working position is a different process. According to Commission Regulation 2015/340 skills and competencies are applicable only at the organization at which the ATCO has been certified.
Both regulations give us the grounds for the selection and training of ATCOs, management of the changes of the systems, procedures and ATCO competencies. ATCOs by themselves cannot ensure safety as standalone entities. The Safety Management System is a part of the ATS provider. Therefore “ATCO mobility” at the level of an individual professional is not possible. The ATCO will exercise her or his competencies only after she or he has been granted the endorsement as part of that particular ATS provider.

4. Automation is not a panacea

The pilot’s job is always put forward as an argument – pilots can “freely” move from airline to airline, why not the ATCOs. But the differences with the pilot working mode and environment that allow natural “pilot mobility” are to be clearly acknowledged. The cockpit’s layout, instruments (HMI) and the level of airborne automation is the same in the same type of aircraft be it at another airline. But you cannot transfer an Airbus A320 pilot to another airline which operates Airbus A380 aircraft, although she or he will know all the equipment in the cockpit. Neither the pilots’ nor the ATCOs’ skills should be explained in a simplistic “cockpit” concept. It is not only about knowing how to push the right sequence of buttons and pronouncing standard phraseology.
In the cockpit there has already been a trend to introduce new technology and more automation. Therefore there are more and more voices that pilots’ skills are undermined by overrelying on automation and human skills must be trained and maintained. Taking the human more and more out of the loop has been proven to be dangerous. The Boeing 737 Max accidents clearly showed the risks of undermined skills combined with incomprehensible automated flight control systems.
These lessons learnt must be kept in mind all the time by people who manage aviation. The new SESAR technological concepts should not be considered to be the ultimate solutions to solve human type of deficits, neither in quantity nor in quality. Such concepts presently targeted at V1 and V2 level of maturity do not provide sufficient basis for reasonable expectations yet. Furthermore, SESAR concepts, which aim at “ensuring safety” while the ATCO “only monitors” how safety is ensured might lead us to a dangerous analogy with the 737 Max case and should be reviewed with caution.
The tendency to rely more and more on systems and less on human skills might lead us into times when safety will no longer be managed with clear mind of human decisions, but we will rely on software, systems, AI and robots, which will hopefully ensure safety. But machines fail from time to time and people might have to live with some level of safety failures, which are not manageable nor understood by humans. Switching the paradigm to “systems are enough, an ATCO only helps” can lead us into a safety challenging future.